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PRESERVING THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT BY REINING IN JUDICIAL
EXPANSION AND MANDATORY USE
Maureen A. Weston*
I. INTRODUCTION
A focus of this symposium issue on “Rethinking the Federal Arbitration
Act” called upon arbitration scholars to consider whether the legal framework
for arbitration set out in the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 19251 appro-
priately addresses modern uses of arbitration.  Professor Alan Rau has articu-
lated his view, not unlike that of prominent arbitration providers and likely that
of many corporate arbitration users, that “it would be far better if we were to
leave the FAA completely alone.”2  Professor Rau cogently argues that, over
time, “courts are more likely than legislators to ‘get it right’”3 and warns of the
dangers of unintended consequences that can arise, good intentions notwith-
standing, with the “reform” or incremental tweaking of a federal statute.4
In reading the statute in its entirety and thinking about “what’s wrong with
the FAA?,” the statute itself appears fairly innocuous—it provides for a proce-
dure to enforce arbitration contracts and to confirm or vacate arbitration awards
in U.S. (federal) courts.5  The purpose of the Act was to reverse judicial hostil-
ity towards arbitration and to ensure the judicial enforcement of parties’ agree-
ments to arbitrate.6  That seems fair enough.
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).  The FAA has not been significantly amended since its
enactment in 1925. See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE
52-53 (4th ed. 2007).
2 Alan Scott Rau, Federal Common Law and Arbitral Power, 8 NEV. L.J. 169, 169 (2007).
Representatives from AAA and JAMS were also in attendance at the Symposium, “Rethink-
ing the Federal Arbitration Act:  An Examination of Whether and How the Statute Should
Be Amended,” held at the Saltman Center for Dispute Resolution at the William S. Boyd
School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, on January 26, 2007.  Eric Tuchman,
General Counsel of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), and Jay Welsh, General
Counsel of JAMS, commented in discussion that their respective institutions’ positions were,
similar to Professor Rau’s, to the leave the FAA alone.
3 Rau, supra note 2, at 169.
4 Id. at 170.
5 See infra Part III.
6 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); see also KATHERINE
V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE:  THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 375-78
(2000) (describing the historical background to the FAA); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory
Misconstruction:  How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never
Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 102-12 (2006) (urging that the FAA be
viewed in historical context); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:  Debunking
the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996)
385
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The impetus for the call to re-examine the FAA, however, may be
explained by the policy concerns that arise from the application of a single
statute, the FAA.  Ostensibly designed to provide for the voluntary private
adjudication of disputes, the FAA generates thousands of lawsuits,7 is vocifer-
ously challenged by consumer protection groups, widely criticized in scholarly
articles, and is judicially determined to preempt and thus substantially restrict
states’ ability to enact legislation responsive to constituent concerns.8  Consid-
ering the statute’s intended regard for the expediency of private adjudication,
the magnitude of litigation that arises from contractual arbitration is ironic.
Indeed, “[the] cries for court interference in the arbitration process are rela-
tively common; so much so that cases submitted to arbitration often result in
satellite litigation in the court system.”9
One problem with the FAA has resulted largely from the common law;
that is, how courts, led by the Supreme Court since the early 1980’s, have
broadly interpreted, and, arguably, misinterpreted the FAA as constituting a
national policy favoring arbitration, and as a body of substantive law that
preempts state law and that applies in state and federal courts to a broad range
of statutory, employment, and consumer claims.10  Section 2 of the FAA, pro-
viding for the judicial enforcement of written agreements to arbitrate,11 has
(extensively analyzing the evolution of FAA arbitration law and arguing that the Supreme
Court’s preference for mandatory binding arbitration lacks basis in legislative history).
7 See, e.g., Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber, Top Ten Developments in Arbi-
tration in the 1990s, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2000-Jan. 2001, at 24, 30 (describing the explo-
sion in consumer arbitration in a variety of areas including consumer purchases, service
contracts, insurance, health-care, attorney-client disputes, and bank-customer agreements).
On September 2, 2007, an on-line LexisNexis legal database search of the term “Federal
Arbitration Act” that appeared in federal and state court decisions resulted in a showing of
more than 3,000 cases.
8 See, e.g., Posting of Pam Smith to http://www.peopleoverprofits.org/ (Nov. 7, 2005) (not-
ing Consumer Attorneys of California opposition to mandatory arbitration).  As Professor
Stempel and others have documented, the new age of mass arbitration, among parties with
disparate bargaining power, information access, economies of scale, and where consent is
dubious, was certainly not the type of arbitration envisioned by the drafters in 1925.  Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251, 251
(2007); see also Sternlight, supra note 6, at 641 (“Congress did not intend to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements that had to be foisted on ignorant consumers, and it did not intend to prevent
states from protecting weaker parties.”).
9 Vestax Sec. Corp. v. Desmond, 919 F. Supp. 1061, 1071 (E.D. Mich. 1995); see also
Quinton F. Seamos, Does Securities Arbitration Go on Forever?  Elgibility and Statutes of
Limitations, INSIGHTS, May 1994, at 17 (“[A]rbitration is becoming the litigation battlefield
that it was intended to avoid.”).
10 Other scholars have written on these subjects and provided persuasive analyses of judicial
misinterpretations of the FAA. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, The Minimal Role of Federalism
and State Law in Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 326 (2007); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral
Justice:  The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1955-67
(1996); Moses, supra note 6; Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act:  The Supreme
Court’s Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53
ALA. L. REV. 789 (2002); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory
Interpretation:  The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5 (2004).
11 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (“A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such con-
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been judicially decreed tantamount as a license to anoint adhesion contracts
requiring arbitration of a broad scope of claims, often in terms and forms far
less favorable to parties of less bargaining power than those in a judicial
forum.12  If anything, the direction the common law has taken towards inter-
preting the application of this congressional arbitration statute has resulted in
considerable controversy and consternation.13  Regrettably, this turn primarily
affects those most in need of protection of their legal rights and fair process.
The criticisms with contemporary uses of arbitration, particularly manifest
in the consumer and employment settings and when mandatory and binding, are
being heard by state and federal lawmakers.  The early efforts of the Montana
legislature to address concerns of consumer surprise at having “agreed” to arbi-
tration via a standard consumer transaction contract by a simple conspicuous
notice requirement were quashed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling that the
FAA preempted state legislation deemed anti-arbitration.14  Similarly, the
Supreme Court has declared broad FAA preemption over state legislation that
imposes conditions upon arbitration or that has sought to ensure judicial resolu-
tion of certain types of claims and thereby excludes or restricts enforcement of
arbitration agreements.15  In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Court effec-
tively shut down state regulatory efforts to restrict the arbitration of employ-
ment cases by reading, despite clear legislative intent otherwise, that the
express exemption in section 1 of the FAA, which excludes “contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” applies only to transportation
employees.16  Bound to follow this precedent, lower state and federal courts
tract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
12 Justice Black, in dissenting to the majority’s announcement of the separability doctrine,
asserted that the Court has regarded arbitration agreements as “super” contracts, “elevate[d]
. . . above all other contractual provisions.”  Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 411 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).  Although most consumer pre-dispute arbi-
tration contracts are arguably not voluntary or the product of negotiation or consent, United
States Supreme Court precedent holds that such mandatory arbitration contracts are enforce-
able, unless other contractual defenses (such as unconscionability, duress, or fraud) apply to
negate the arbitration contract. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S.
79 (2000).
13 See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:  Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33;
Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for
Binding Arbitration:  A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due
Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997).
14 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (quoting MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995) (enforcing an agreement, under the FAA, preempting the state
statute that required “‘[n]otice that [the] contract is subject to arbitration’ . . . [and shall be]
‘typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract’”).
15 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding that the FAA
preempts Alabama law denying enforcement of predispute arbitration contracts); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (declaring that the FAA preempts state legislation
requiring judicial resolution of franchise disputes).
16 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001); see, e.g., Moses, supra note
6, at 105-06 (recounting legislative discussion that indicates FAA supporters did not intend
the Act to apply to workers at all or to consumer transactions); Pittman, supra note 10, at
887 (asserting that “[t]he Court’s judicial economy rationale in support of [employment]
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reject claimants seeking judicial recourse, even if provided for by state law or
for claims arising under federal employment statutory laws.17
Given the preemptive effect accorded to the FAA, the ability of the states
to enact protective legislation to ensure fairness in arbitration or access to the
courts has been significantly, and unduly, limited.18  Nonetheless, state legisla-
tures continue to grapple with how to protect potential abuses in arbitration via
state legislation.19  In 2002, for example, the California Assembly undertook
hearings to examine concerns of arbitration abuses.  Although it could not
directly ban consumer arbitration, the California legislature approved legisla-
tion regulating provider institutions and adopting detailed ethics and disclosure
rules for arbitrators.20
A comprehensive effort to examine arbitration law was conducted by the
Drafting Committee for the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (“RUAA”).  Most
state arbitration laws have been based upon the Uniform Arbitration Act
(“UAA”), promulgated in 1955, which largely tracked the FAA.21  The impetus
arbitration is contrary to Congress’s intent which, unlike the Court’s intent, does not favor
arbitration over court adjudication, and which through section 1’s exclusion sought to
exempt from the FAA’s coverage all employees whose work affects interstate commerce”).
17 See, e.g., S&G Elec., Inc. v. Normant Sec. Group, Inc., No. 06-3759, 2007 WL 210517
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2007) (ruling that the FAA preempts state law barring out of state arbitra-
tions by subcontractors); Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enters., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 326, 327 (Ct.
App. Mar. 22, 2007) (holding that FAA preempts state statute barring arbitration of home
construction disputes); Bungard v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 433 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that, although fired employee whose employment contract required arbitra-
tion would have a right under the state arbitration statute to pursue his federal and state
discrimination claims in court, court must compel arbitration under U.S. Supreme Court
precedent in Southland Corp. v. Keating and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.).
18 Although virtually every state has arbitration statutes, these statutes have largely adopted
the form of the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1955. See RUAA, UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT,
prefatory note (revised 2000) (noting that as of 2000, “[f]orty-nine jurisdictions have arbitra-
tion statutes; 35 of these have adopted the UAA and 14 have adopted substantially similar
legislation”).  States have not been as eager to adopt the RUAA in its entirety.  Since pro-
mulgation by NCUSSL in 2000, the RUAA has been adopted in twelve states, and is pend-
ing passage in fourteen states.  CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 89.
19 A number of states have attempted to outlaw mandatory employment arbitration. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1517 (2007) (restricting arbitration of employment
claims); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401(c)(2) (2006) (same); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 399-c
(McKinney 2007) (prohibiting arbitration in consumer contracts).  Under Circuit City, 532
U.S. 105, these laws are preempted by the FAA. See supra note 16.
20 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.92 (West 2007) (prohibiting providers from adminis-
tering consumer arbitrations where the provider has a financial relationship with a party); Id.
§ 1281.96 (requiring publication of consumer arbitration information by providers); Id.
§ 1284.3 (prohibiting providers from administering arbitrations with loser-pay require-
ments); CAL. CT. R., ETHICS STANDARDS FOR NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS IN CONTRACTUAL
ARBITRATION (2002).
21 RUAA, UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, prefatory note.  Some have posited that this parallel
legislation was intentional, such that the FAA was to apply to federal courts, while the UAA
would apply as adopted by the states for enforcement of arbitration contracts in state courts.
See Moses, supra note 6, at 101-02 (describing FAA drafters “three step plan” for promoting
arbitration at state, federal, and international levels, via the UAA, FAA, and New York
Convention, respectively).  Under the Supreme Court’s rulings that the FAA was enacted
pursuant to Congress’s commerce powers, the FAA is deemed to preempt conflicting state
arbitration laws.
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for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(“NCCUSL”) to appoint a committee to consider revising the Act was due to
the “increasing use of arbitration, the greater complexity of many disputes
resolved by arbitration, and the developments of law in this area.”22  Cognizant
of the Supreme Court’s preemption rulings, the RUAA drafters recognized
their limitations in drafting state arbitration legislation to address policy issues
regarding mandatory arbitration.  Thus, the RUAA addresses largely procedural
and arbitration management issues.  As adopted, the RUAA addresses fourteen
specific areas not addressed in the UAA (and therefore, the FAA).23  Despite
the concerted efforts of the RUAA drafters, the statute has not been received as
the cure for arbitration’s ills.24
Even with passage of the RUAA and bolder attempts at regulating state
arbitration laws, state lawmakers, the courts, lawyers, and parties remain per-
plexed as to what they can do to respond to concerns of potential abuses in
arbitration.  Given the broad preemptive effect and construction accorded by
the Supreme Court to the FAA, the states’ ability to enact protective measures
is greatly hindered, or, as characterized, perhaps correctly albeit controver-
sially, by Professor Rau, virtually “irrelevant.”25
The tide in some courts is shifting, as courts must deal with challenges to
contracts that require arbitration of claims between parties of disparate bargain-
ing power and also increasingly to provisions that purport to waive (or ban)
rights to class actions and legal remedies, and which essentially deprive parties
of any fair forum at all.26  While a judicial trend may eventually develop to
address troubling application of the FAA, the penalty upon those who are
caught now in the process is exacting.  States and the courts have created laws
to fill in many of the gaps not addressed by the FAA, but that results in a
patchwork of varying laws, all operating under the specter of preemption.
What is perhaps most disconcerting is that the broad and effectively unreview-
able powers accorded to private arbitrators to determine “arbitrability” issues as
22 RUAA, UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, prefatory note.
23 Id.  Unlike the UAA, the RUAA contains provisions regarding a range of issues, includ-
ing:  arbitrability, provisional remedies, initiation of an arbitration proceeding, consolidation,
arbitrator disclosures, arbitrator immunity, arbitrator testimony, prehearing management,
arbitral remedies, waiver, subpoena power, vacatur, and notice standards.
24 For example, the RUAA does not address issues regarding the enforceability of adhesion
contracts in employment and consumer contexts. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 89
(criticizing the RUAA for addressing “a number of controversial developments in the law
either by taking a side . . . or by determining that it should not take any action at all . . . .”).
25 Rau, supra note 2, at 176.
26 See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding as unconscionable
arbitration provision which, inter alia, limited remedies and eliminated class actions); Hoot-
ers of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (refusing to enforce arbitration
process as too biased); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.
2000) (voiding arbitration clause which limited recoverable damages as unconscionable); see
CARBONNEAU, supra note 1 (noting the reluctance of a minority of courts, in particular in
California, to enforce adhesionary arbitration contracts frequently voided on basis of uncon-
scionability and lack of mutuality); see also Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257
(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding class action waiver provision unconscionable); Kinkel v.
Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006) (summarizing unconscionability rulings
on class action waivers). But cf. Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912
A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006) (class action waiver not per se unconscionable).
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well as all legal rights of the parties and classes of claimants portends that the
courts, and thus the public, may never see or know how arbitration issues are
determined, or how parties in an arbitration are treated.27
Absent an abrupt shift by the Supreme Court, only Congress has the power
to prevent usurpation of the FAA and to preserve the FAA.  Some in Congress
are listening, and hopefully the contributions of this Symposium re-examining
the FAA will further propel federal legislators to act.  In the proposed Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act of 2007, recently introduced by Senator Russ Feingold (D-
WI) and Representative Hank Johnson (D-GA), pre-dispute agreements to arbi-
trate employment, consumer, and franchise disputes are unenforceable.28
Would this legislation cure the complaints about the FAA?
This Article considers the rationale for arbitration reform, as well as the
arguments for no reform at all.  Part II sets out the FAA’s basic framework and
discusses the Supreme Court decisions, which have arguably expanded the
scope of the FAA and enabled a controversial use of modern arbitration.  Part
III considers specific proposals warranting congressional attention, including
pending legislation under the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007.  Part
IV concludes in offering final thoughts for arbitration reform.
II. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND ITS JUDICIAL AFTERMATH
Much has been written about the FAA, its legislative history, and Supreme
Court decisions giving broad construction to the FAA.29  This section attempts
only to set forth the basic elements of the statute, against the backdrop that the
essential purpose of the FAA, substantially unchanged since 1925, was to pro-
vide for the enforcement of voluntary agreements to arbitrate.30  Within this
framework, key Supreme Court decisions interpreting the FAA are analyzed.
A. The FAA Basics
The basic provisions and operation of the FAA are relatively
straightforward.
27 Because of an expansive definition of “arbitrability,” the scope of matters that are “arbi-
trable” is broad.  In holding that courts are merely to decide whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate and that all other matters are for the arbitrator, the Supreme Court has avoided
ruling on controversial arbitration policy issues. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (affirming the separability doctrine in ruling that arbitrators
decide fraud challenges to the validity of a contract); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539
U.S. 444 (2003) (holding that the arbitrator decides, as a matter of contract interpretation,
whether parties intended to forbid class arbitration and implicitly approving of class arbitra-
tion); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S 938 (1995) (ruling that arbitrator should
decide procedural defense of whether statute of limitations barred agreement); see also Alan
S. Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction and the Dimensions of Consent, ARB. INT’L (forthcoming
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1001708.
28 See infra Part III.B.
29 See supra notes 6 and 10.
30 See, e.g., Moses, supra note 6, at 102-12 (analyzing FAA legislative history and conclud-
ing that the drafters intended the FAA to provide for a procedure in federal courts for volun-
tary agreements, among merchants or parties of equivalent bargaining power, to arbitrate
contractual disputes).
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Section 1 of the Act sets out definitions for “maritime transactions,” “com-
merce,” and the “employment” exception (which the Court has interpreted as
exempting only transportation industry employees).31  The heart of the statute
lies in section 2, which provides for the validity and enforcement of written
agreements to arbitration, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.”32  Section 3 provides for a stay of any
lawsuit brought “in any of the courts of the United States” where any issue
therein is referable to arbitration.33  Section 4 permits a party to an arbitration
agreement to petition to U.S. district courts, otherwise having jurisdiction,34 to
compel arbitration.35  Section 5 provides for the judicial appointment of an
arbitrator or arbitrators where needed.36  Section 6 provides that applications
and motions pertaining to arbitration are heard in the same manner as court
motions.37  Under section 7, arbitrators are granted subpoena powers equivalent
to a court of law.38  Section 8 addresses maritime litigation.39  Section 9 autho-
rizes a party, within one year of entering the arbitral award, to seek judicial
confirmation of the award, upon which a judgment of the award is decreed.40
Section 10 specifies four grounds upon which a federal court may vacate an
arbitral award.41  Section 11 permits courts to correct or modify awards con-
31 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
32 9 U.S.C. § 2.
33 Id. § 3.
34 Unlike any other federal statute, the FAA does not provide an independent basis for
subject matter jurisdiction.  Despite cogent arguments that this fact negates treatment for
preemption, the Court has found FAA preemption is justified pursuant to Congress’s com-
merce power. See Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938); Pittman, supra note 10, at 792; Schwartz, supra note 10, at 7. But cf.
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland:  Reexamining the Legislative History of
the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002).
35 9 U.S.C. § 4.
36 Id. § 5.
37 Id. § 6.
38 Id. § 7 (providing that “[t]he arbitrators . . . may summon . . . any person”) (emphasis
added).  The federal courts are divided on whether this section authorizes arbitrators to sub-
poena nonparties for prehearing discovery requests. Compare Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S.
Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding arbitrator lacked such authority),
with Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Celanese AG, 430 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2005) (construing section 7 to
authorize broad arbitral subpoena powers).
39 9 U.S.C. § 8.
40 Id. § 9.
41 Id. § 10 (providing for vacatur of an arbitral award on the grounds of (1) fraud or undue
means; (2) evident partiality; (3) arbitral misconduct in the proceedings; or (4) where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers).  The standard for vacatur is extremely high and relates to
significant deficiencies in the arbitral process rather than to substantive errors on the merits.
There is debate whether the statutory grounds for vacatur are exclusive; some courts recog-
nize common law exceptions for awards in “manifest disregard of the law,” “contrary to
public policy,” and by state statutes that provide additional grounds for vacatur. See Wallace
v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2004); RUAA, UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, prefatory note
(revised 2000).  A related issue concerns a debate percolating before the Supreme Court as to
whether parties may contract for increased (or limited) judicial review of arbitral awards.
See, e.g., Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003)
(enforcing provision).  The Supreme Court has agreed to decide if parties can contract for
expanded judicial review. See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 196 F. App’x 476
(9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2875 (2007).
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taining evident formalistic or technical errors.42  Under section 12, notice of
motions to vacate or modify awards must be made within three months after the
award is filed.43  Section 13 sets forth administrative requirements for filing
papers with motions seeking relief under the Act.44  Section 14 clarifies that the
Act was not retroactive to 1926.45  Section 15 speaks to the “[i]napplicability of
the Act of State doctrine.”46  Finally, section 16 provides for a right of interloc-
utory appeals that may be taken from orders essentially denying arbitration.47
The foregoing provisions do not appear particularly problematic.  In
essence, the FAA provides for a procedure for the judicial enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate.  Granted, the statute does not address the plethora of
policy, legal, and practical issues that have arisen as a result of the FAA’s
provision for arbitration.  Should it?  Are the courts doing their job by appropri-
ately interpreting the statute consistent with the purpose of the law?
B. FAA Expansion via Judicial Construction
A number of commentators have argued that the need for FAA reform is
driven by Supreme Court jurisprudence that misinterprets the FAA, expands
the FAA beyond its intended application, and thus has enabled a use and indus-
try for mandatory arbitration that was never envisioned.48  The “findings” sec-
tion of the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 echoes this sentiment,
providing:
(1) The Federal Arbitration Act (now enacted as chapter 1 of title 9 of the United
States Code) was intended to apply to disputes between commercial entities of gener-
ally similar sophistication and bargaining power.
(2) A series of United States Supreme Court decisions have changed the meaning of
the Act so that it now extends to disputes between parties of greatly disparate eco-
nomic power, such as consumer disputes and employment disputes.  As a result, a
large and rapidly growing number of corporations are requiring millions of consum-
ers and employees to give up their right to have disputes resolved by a judge or jury,
and instead submit their claims to binding arbitration.49
Although the Supreme Court was initially reluctant to interpret the FAA
expansively,50 this judicial hostility towards arbitration turned to an apparent
infatuation.  In subsequent decisions, the Court announced that the FAA estab-
42 9 U.S.C. § 11.
43 Id. § 12.
44 Id. § 13.
45 Id. § 14.
46 Id. § 15; see CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 80-81 (explaining that the section is “inappo-
sitely situated in the domestic section of U.S. law of arbitration,” and clarifying that “the Act
of State doctrine, although it could preclude the enforcement of an ordinary judicial judg-
ment, cannot be used to challenge a judicial judgment that provides for the enforcement of
an arbitral award”).
47 9 U.S.C. § 16; see CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 82 (explaining that the section, added
in 1988, authorizes interlocutory appeal that exists against court orders antagonistic to the
pursuit of arbitration, such as an order refusing to stay litigation or to compel arbitration).
48 See supra notes 6 and 13.
49 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 2(1)(2) (2007).
50 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953) (noting that the purpose of the Securities Act
was to protect investors and thus holding that the Act prohibits a waiver of a judicial remedy
by a pre-dispute arbitration agreement), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
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lished a “national policy favoring arbitration.”51  Based upon this policy and
the FAA’s text, the Court has determined the FAA’s preeminence over state
law,52 declared the statute applicable in state courts,53 and upheld the enforce-
ment of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in a variety of contexts,
including for the private adjudication of statutory and common law claims in
employment and consumer transactions.54  This endorsement of contractual
arbitration triggered an exponential growth in the use of arbitration beyond the
commercial context to adhesion contracts in employment and consumer cases.
“[G]eneralized attacks” about potential unfairness in arbitration, however, are
not deemed sufficient to permit escape from the arbitration obligation.55
III. THOUGHTS FOR REFORM
A. Correct Judicial Misinterpretations Expanding the FAA
The questionable Supreme Court precedent attributable to the call for FAA
reform can be classified into three areas:  (1) the preemption rulings; (2) the
narrow reading of the section 1 employment exception in Circuit City v.
Adams;56 and (3) the enforcement of arbitration contracts that are not realisti-
cally voluntary.57  In analyzing areas for FAA reform (or preservation), the
following identifies the central Supreme Court decisions or issues that warrant
statutory reconsideration.
1. Say Southland Corp v. Keating Is Wrong (and Return Power to the
States)
The controversial determination that the FAA preempts conflicting state
law can be traced to Southland v. Keating.58  In Southland, the Supreme Court
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (relying on the federal policy of favoring arbitration
in reversing Wilko and holding that securities claims are arbitrable).
51 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing federal
policy favoring arbitration in ruling that federal age discrimination claims are arbitrable).
52 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see infra Part III.A.
53 Because the FAA does not provide an independent basis for federal subject matter juris-
diction, in practice many claims concerning arbitration are heard by state courts, which must
determine whether to apply the FAA (which only speaks to federal courts) and/or state arbi-
tration laws. See Southland, 465 U.S. 1.
54 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that statutory claims are
also subject to a pre-employment arbitration agreement contained in an employment applica-
tion); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (requiring arbitration of
consumer statutory claims).
55 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.  Claims by the plaintiff in Gilmer that compulsory arbitration of
statutory discrimination claims is inconsistent with the statutory framework, that it deprives
claimants of a judicial forum, that panels will be biased, that discovery is limited, and that
effective review is unavailable, were deemed “generalized attacks” insufficient to preclude
enforcement of arbitration agreements, despite the parties’ unequal bargaining power. Id. at
27-31.
56 Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105.
57 This list is obviously not exhaustive or represented as new or provocative.  But a re-
examination of the FAA should consider that a critical mass of scholarly criticism and cries
from affected litigants and the public challenge arbitration on these grounds. See, e.g., Jean
R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:  Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005).
58 Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ116.txt unknown Seq: 10 24-JAN-08 14:40
394 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:385
held that the FAA preempted the California Franchise Investment Law, which
required judicial adjudication of claims brought under the state statute.  The
Court announced that “[i]n creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well
as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”  In short, Southland and
its progeny establish that the FAA is an exercise of Congress’s commerce
power, preempts conflicting state law, and applies in state and federal courts,
despite the fact that the Act’s text is directed to the federal courts presumably
as a procedural statute and does not provide an independent basis for federal
subject matter jurisdiction.59
A number of Justices are highly critical of the decision that the FAA is a
substantive provision applicable in state courts and concede that the preemption
rationale set forth in Southland is erroneous.60  Over ten years later, Justices
Scalia and Thomas remain ardently opposed to the ruling that the FAA applies
in state courts.61  According to Justice Scalia, “Adhering to Southland entails a
permanent unauthorized eviction of state-court power to adjudicate a poten-
tially large class of disputes.”62
A legislative correction of Southland63 and a declaration that the FAA
applies only to the federal courts would realign the statute to comport with its
intended scope and with federalism principles regarding the function of the
states.64  Granted, such a move would involve a significant unraveling of prece-
dent.65  Although the preemption rationale under Southland remains dubious,
FAA preemption has been justified under the Commerce Clause (if not simply
engrained as stare decisis).66  And it may make sense, in a national and global
economy, to have a uniform federal law that governs arbitration agreements.67
59 See also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (affirming
Southland’s federalism policy); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
60 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 21-36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court’s
analysis is inconsistent with FAA legislative history, as well as the mandates that Congress
cannot regulate procedures in state courts under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), and the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652).
61 Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“For the reasons set forth in
Justice Thomas’ opinion, which I join, I agree with the respondents (and belatedly with
Justice O’Connor) that Southland clearly misconstrued the Federal Arbitration Act.  I do not
believe that proper application of stare decisis prevents correction of a mistake.”).
62 Id. at 284-85.
63 Professor Schwartz has quite convincingly demonstrated the failings of the Southland
decision.  Schwartz, supra note 10, at 54. But cf. Drahozal, supra note 34, at 105.
64 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 10, at 15.
65 The FAA preemption doctrine has become entrenched stare decisis and accepted as pre-
cedent, notwithstanding objections to the rationale in Southland. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S.
at 282-84 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas does not view overruling Southland
as problematic. Id. at 286 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
66 See Moses, supra note 6, at 109 (describing statement of Julius Cohen, drafter of FAA in
1925 legislative hearings as testifying that “Congress probably does have ‘ample power to
declare that all arbitration agreements connected with interstate commerce . . . as valid and
enforceable even by the State courts’”).
67 Despite protestations, Justice O’Connor acquiesces with the majority’s ruling that the
FAA applies in state courts:  “In the end, my agreement with the Court’s construction of § 2
rests largely on the wisdom of maintaining a uniform standard.” See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S.
at 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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If the FAA is a substantive law, based on Congress’s commerce power,
and if state courts are to apply the FAA, then an amended FAA should (1) omit
references to “United States” courts in enforcement sections of the Act; (2)
define the scope of the FAA by providing an objective standard for determining
when a transaction “involves interstate commerce” so that state courts know
when to apply the FAA or state arbitration law; and (3) clarify matters that
remain within state purview to regulate.68
2. Say Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams Is Wrong (and Preserve the
FAA’s Employment Exception)69
Under section 1, the FAA shall not “apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce.”70  A plain reading, whether reinforced by consistent
legislative history or not, should find this to mean that employment (like labor)
contracts are not subject to the FAA.71  The Court in Circuit City found the
reading of this text an “insurmountable textual obstacle,”72 although refusing to
consider legislative history, and concluded that the employment exception was
to be narrowly construed to except only workers directly involved in the inter-
state transport of goods and services.73  An amended FAA can clarify what
plain reading and legislative history confirm:  that the FAA does not apply to
employment contracts.  The magnitude of litigation over employment arbitra-
tion, the arbitration of statutory rights, and charges of unconscionable arbitra-
tion practices should underscore the need to address this area.74
3. Consider a Specific Exception or Due Process Treatment for
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment and Consumer Statutory
Claims
As many of the unfairness claims derive from the FAA’s application to
arbitration required by adhesion contracts in employment and consumer cases,
an amended FAA should consider an explicit exception for arbitration that is
effectively mandatory and that involves the adjudication of consumer and
employee statutory claims.75  It is particularly problematic for the statutory
68 Such amendments would clarify the ambiguities raised in cases such as Allied Bruce as
well as assist state lawmakers and the courts in understanding the role of state regulation.
69 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that the exclusion
applies only to contracts of workers directly involved in the interstate transport of goods and
services).
70 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (emphasis added).
71 See Moses, supra note 6, at 108.
72 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114.
73 Id. at 118-19; see also Moses, supra note 6, at 110, 147-48 (describing legislative history
and Court’s refusal to consider it).
74 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (rejecting
employee’s complaint of prohibitively high arbitration costs); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding arbitration agreement unconscionable); Ingle
v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. 328 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); see also Moses,
supra note 6, at 146-52 (criticizing Circuit City v. Adams).
75 The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 does exempt consumer, employment, and
franchise pre-dispute arbitration contracts. See infra Part IV.
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rights of consumers and employees to be decided in arbitration.  The protective
function that statutes are designed to serve cannot be adequately assured in a
process which lacks transparency, accountability, or review.76
Absent a blanket exclusion, an amended FAA should consider a separate
provision for the treatment of employment and consumer arbitrations, where
higher levels of procedural protection or review may be warranted.77  For one,
the Act should make unenforceable arbitration contracts that seek to limit an
employee or consumer’s right to statutory remedies.78  Moreover, the lack of
process protections, coupled with the narrow grounds for reviewing or vacating
an arbitral award, while helpful to ensure finality, pose a significant risk that
the rights of those most in need of protection are disregarded.  Accordingly, the
Act should provide for due process protocols specific to employment and con-
sumer arbitrations.79
An amended FAA must also address the availability and treatment of class
actions and class arbitrations, specifically the practice in contracts that purport
to ban or waive a party’s right to proceed collectively, whether in a class action
or a class arbitration.80  An adhesive, pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate should
not be the means to eviscerate a vital procedural vehicle.  As noted by the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, “Corporations should not be permitted to
use class action waivers as a means to exculpate themselves from liability for
small-value claims.”81  If class arbitration is deemed appropriate under the
FAA, the statute should set forth parameters for class arbitration to ensure con-
sistency in administration and due process protection for all class members.82
76 See Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and
Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449 (2004).
77 For example, California has specific rules relating to consumer arbitrations. See supra
note 20.
78 See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); David S. Schwartz, Under-
standing Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses:  Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion
Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 58 (2003).
79 Due Process protocols for consumer and employment arbitrations have been promulgated
and adopted by respected arbitration provider institutions; however, compliance in non-spon-
sored arbitrations is not guaranteed. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE
PROCESS PROTOCOL (1998), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019; AM. ARBI-
TRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1995), available at http://www.adr.
org/sp.asp?id=28535.
80 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration To Eliminate Con-
sumer Class Actions:  Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2004).  Courts have differed over the highly litigated question of
whether express bans on class actions contained in consumer arbitration agreements are
enforceable under the FAA or subject to state contract law defenses such as unconscionabil-
ity or contrary to public policy.  Recent cases refusing to enforce class action waivers in
consumer arbitration clauses include Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir.
2007); Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007); and
Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007) (holding, in a 4-3 ruling, the class action
waiver in Circuit City agreement invalid under California law).
81 Dale, 498 F.3d at 1224.
82 See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding:  The Constitutional Implications of
Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1717 (2006).
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B. Proposals Under the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007
As the criticisms of mandatory arbitration have mounted, some members
of Congress are listening.  Although a number of bills have been introduced in
Congress to prohibit use of mandatory arbitration in particular areas, to date the
only such bill passed by Congress denies enforceability of arbitration provi-
sions in contracts imposed by automobile manufacturers on dealer/
franchisees.83
On July 12, 2007, a bill seeking to amend the FAA entitled the “Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act of 2007,” was introduced in both the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate.84  The proposed Act would prohibit enforcement of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in employment, consumer, and franchise cases.
The Findings section of the proposed Act is particularly tuned into the
concerns of mandatory consumer arbitration and critical of Supreme Court rul-
ings that have “extend[ed the reach of the FAA] to disputes between parties of
greatly disparate economic power.”85  It adds that “[a]s a result, a large and
rapidly growing number of corporations are requiring millions of consumers
and employees to give up their right to have disputes resolved by a judge or
jury, and instead submit their claims to binding arbitration.”86  The bill further
states:
[M]ost consumers and employees have little or no meaningful option whether to
submit their claims to arbitration.  Few people realize, or understand the importance
of the deliberately fine print that strips them of rights; and because entire industries
are adopting these clauses, people increasingly have no choice but to accept them.
They must often give up their rights as a condition of having a job, getting necessary
medical care, buying a car, opening a bank account, getting a credit card, and the
like.  Often times, they are not even aware that they have given up their rights.87
According to the bill, mandatory arbitration undermines the development
of public law for protecting civil rights and consumer rights due to its lack of
transparency and of meaningful judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions.88  In
addition, “[w]hile the American civil justice system features publicly accounta-
ble decision makers who generally issue written decisions that are widely avail-
able to the public, arbitration offers none of these features.”89
The primary impact of the bill would amend section 2 of the FAA to
provide:
(b) No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires
arbitration of—
(1) an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute; or
83 Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-273,
§ 11028, 116 Stat. 1758, 1835-36 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1226).
84 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007).
85 Id. § 2(2).
86 Id.
87 Id. § 2(3).
88 Id. § 2(5) (further providing “[w]ith the knowledge that their rulings will not be seriously
examined by a court applying current law, arbitrators enjoy near complete freedom to ignore
the law and even their own rules”).
89 Id. § 2(6).
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(2) a dispute arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights or to regu-
late contracts or transactions between parties of unequal bargaining power.90
This proposed legislation certainly has the support of consumer advocates.
To some, this bill would “preserve the integrity of arbitration and restore the
original intent of the FAA.”91
IV. CONCLUSION
The use of arbitration has changed significantly since the FAA’s inception
in 1925, from the traditional model involving voluntary arbitration between
parties of relatively equal bargaining power, to a system where arbitration is
imposed upon consumers and employees and where arbitration has become a
profession and commercialized industry.  Meanwhile, a significant body of fed-
eral and state law, both statutory and common, has since developed to protect
civil rights, market competition, employees, and consumers.  Congress should
be concerned that these rights are being adjudicated, if at all, in a forum not
necessarily of both parties’ volition.  If we accept that the FAA is a substantive
law, based on Congress’s commerce power, and agree that state courts are to
apply the FAA, then at a minimum, an amended FAA should provide more
guidance on significant issues that have arisen since 1925, particularly those
relating to consumer and statutory claims.92
Legislative change, such as that proposed herein and in the Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007, if passed, would radically change the current landscape
of corporate uses of arbitration provisions in contracts with employees, con-
sumers, and franchisees.  As a practical matter, the supporters of arbitration
status quo may be more mobilized to convince federal lawmakers that the FAA
is alright as is.
A saving grace in Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence has been its
assurance that, by agreeing to arbitrate, parties do not agree to forego their
substantive rights.93  But a fair process is inextricably tied to one’s ability to
vindicate substantive rights.  Granted, a statute cannot, and need not, provide a
level of detail to address or anticipate all issues that may arise.  But where a
federal statute is interpreted and used to authorize arbitration practices that
raise questions of fairness and a potential deprivation of public rights, congres-
sional attention is warranted.
90 Id. § 4 (“An issue as to whether this chapter applies to an arbitration agreement shall be
determined by Federal law.  Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the validity or
enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate shall be determined by the court, rather than the
arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration
agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing such
agreement.”).
91 Justin Kelly, Bills to Limit Pre-Dispute Arbitration Under FAA Before Congress, ADR
World.com, July 17, 2007, http://adrworld.com/sp.asp?id=41281 (registration required)
(quoting attorney Cliff Palefsky).
92 See Weston, supra note 82.
93 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (By “agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” (citation
omitted)).
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If anything, the FAA should return to its roots and require informed and
voluntary “consent” to arbitration.94  Then, freedom to contract would have
meaning and arbitration legitimacy.
94 See Andrew M. Kepper, Contractual Waiver of Seventh Amendment Rights:  Using the
Public Rights Doctrine to Justify a Higher Standard of Waiver for Jury-Waiver Clauses than
for Arbitration Clauses, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1345 (2006); Jeremy Senderowicz, Consumer
Arbitration and Freedom of Contract:  A Proposal to Facilitate Consumers’ Informed Con-
sent to Arbitration Clauses in Form Contracts, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 275, 296-99
(1999); Jean R. Sternlight, Gateway Widens Doorway to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitra-
tion on Consumers, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1997, at 8, 10, 12.
